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THE SCHECHTER CASE

BY RALPH F. FUCHS

In the preceding issue of this Review some of the indications
of the possible conclusions of the Supreme Court with regard to
the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act
were pointed out., The Court, of course, has now spoken in a
decision which in sweeping terms declares the invalidity of the
challenged statute. 2 It remains for commentators to consider the
validity of the Court's methods and conclusions and for the nation to formulate, if it can, substitute measures for coping with
its continuing economic and social difficulties.
I.

THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL POWER

First in importance among the results of the Court's disposition of the case is the uncertainty in which it leaves the key
question of the scope of the Federal power to regulate the conduct of business enterprises. Reflecting, to some extent, a lack
of discrimination in the Government's brief, the Court has come
forth with an utterance upon this point which, until it is clarified
by future decisions or by constitutional amendment, is certain
to constitute the outstanding enigma in American public affairs.
In its relation to interstate commerce the businesses involved
in the Schechter case exemplify the third of the four classes of
enterprises previously pointed out in these pages3-that is, they
are businesses which furnish a market for a product (live poultry) which moves in interstate commerce. New York City, in
which the businesses are located, contains by far the principal
I Fuchs, Judicial Method and the Constitutionality of the N. I. R. A.
(1935) 20 St. Louis L. Rev. 199.
2A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 55 S. Ct. 837.
a 20 St. Louis L. Rev. at 210.
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market for this product, outweighing all others combined in the
volume of receipts. Consequently the price 6btained for the
product there sets the prices in other markets and the farm
prices throughout the country. Loss of consumer confidence in
the quality of live poultry sold in the New York market is quickly
reflected in the demand for the product and results in a lowering
of the retail price there and of the wholesale and farm prices
everywhere, as well as in a diminution of shipments. Closing
the New York market to unfit poultry drives such poultry from
interstate commerce. Ninety-six percent of the live poultry entering the New York market comes from other states. The state
from which the largest volume of poultry moves is Missouri.
These facts were established by evidence to the satisfaction of
the trial court, are stated in the opinion of the circuit court of
appeals,4 and appear to be accepted by the Supreme Court.
In accordance with the provisiorls of the National Industrial
Recovery Act the "Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry
Industry in the Metropolitan Area in and about the City of New
York" was approved by the President, April 13, 1934. Its provisions included prohibitions in regard to what were deemed
abuses in the handling and sale of live poultry by the operators
of wholesale slaughter houses, who kill the poultry for customers
immediately upon its purchase. The purchasers are retail meat
dealers. The wholesale slaughter house operators purchase the
poultry from "receivers" at the freight terminals and at West
Washington Street Market. These transactions have been adjudicated to be in interstate commerce in a previous decision of
the Supreme Court. The Live Poultry Code also established
minimum wages and maximum hours for the employees of wholesale slaughter house operators.
The defendants in the trial court, operators of wholesale
slaughter houses, were convicted of violations of both "fair practice" and wage and hour provisions of the Live Poultry Code.
The convictions as to the former were upheld in the circuit court
of appeals; those as to the latter were reversed upon the ground
that the wages and hours of the defendants' employees did not
4United States v. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. (C. C. A. 2, 1935)
76 F. (2d) 617.
5 Local 167, Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (1934) 291
U. S. 293, 20 St. Louis L. Rev. at 207-208.
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have so direct an effect upon interstate commerce as to sustain
the application of the Federal regulatory power to them. The
Supreme Court held that the convictions upon all counts should
have been reversed upon the dual ground that the provisions of
the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President
to approve codes of fair competition contained an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power which invalidated all such
codes and that none of the aspects of the defendants' businesses
which were sought to be controlled were subject to the Federal
regulatory power.
The decision, of course, is limited to the facts of the case. By
it, in the first place, the Court rejects the "purchasing power"
basis for Federal regulation of wages and hours. That is, the
fact that the movement of products in interstate commerce depends partly upon the demand for such products and that, in
turn, the demand depends largely upon employment and wages,
does not establish a sufficiently direct relationship between employment and interstate commerce to support Federal regulation.
The case decides also that efforts to stimulate interstate commerce by preserving fair competition in intrastate markets and
to bar deleterious products by preventing their sale after they
have left interstate commerce are without constitutional warrant.
If the Court had stopped there, the situation would at least
be clear. But the Government in its brief,7 in the course of arguing that the wages paid by the defendants have an economic effect which reaches beyond the boundaries of New York, cited as
analogous the subversive results of low-cost competition by foreign producers, which flexible tariffs are designed to meet, and
referred to similar problems attending the competition among
producers in the several states. Presidential and Congressional
utterances and excerpts from committee hearings in regard to
this aspect of the economic situation were reproduced in the appendix. Obviously the case did not involve this problem. Perhaps taking its cue from the Government's elision of the distinction, the Court in its opinion slides over the essential difference
between wages in establishments such as the defendants' and
wages in establishments whose product afterward enters inter6 20 St. Louis L. Rev. at 210.
7 Pp. 50-52.
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state commerce and competes in markets in other states with the
product of producers located elsewhere. In the latter situation
the cost at which the product can be "laid down" in the market
is the all-important factor in the survival of producers, and it
may be that the need of establishing a fairly uniform level of
competition as a condition of preserving any regulation at all
justifies Federal control in such situations-a justification which
certainly was not available to sustain the Live Poultry Code.
The Court may or may not have been aware of the distinction
just emphasized. If it was, it probably intended to ignore it and
to condemn Federal regulation of labor conditions outside the
interstate transportation, communication, and power industries,
although this is by no means certain. If it did not have the distinction in mind, it is impossible to tell from the opinion whether
Federal control of labor relations and other factors affecting
costs in industries which ship across state lines would be sustained. Therein lies the enigma. In a single paragraph Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, points out that the question of the wages and hours of defendants' employees "differs in
no essential respect from similar questions in other local businesses which handle commodities brought into a state" and then
goes on to say that if the Government's argument were accepted,
"All the processes of production and distribution that enter into
cost could likewise be controlled." One cannot tell whether in the
course of this paragraph there has been a shift from consideration of businesses like the defendants' to businesses of other
types as well. In the following paragraph the Court summarizes
the Government's broader contention, referred to above, as a
statement "that efforts to enact state legislation establishing high
labor standards have been impeded by the belief that, unless
similar action is taken generally, commerce will be diverted from
the states adopting such standards, and that this fear of diversion has led to demands for federal legislation on the subject of
wages and hours," leading to the view "that the federal authority
under the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the
establishment of rules to govern wages and hours in interstate
trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus overriding the authority of the states to deal with domestic problems
arising from labor conditions in their internal commerce." This
argument, of course, is rejected. If the Chief Justice intended
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by this utterance to strike down Federal control of wages and
hours in the manufacture of products for the interstate market,
his statement of the opposing belief that in the absence of Federal
control "commerce will be diverted" from the states adopting
high standards was not very felicitous. The fear is, rather, that
producers in such states will not be able to enter into commerce
with fair competitive prospects. In a sense this is "diverting"
commerce, but not in the modern every-day sense of the words.
The remainder of the Chief Justice's opinion leaves the matter
of the scope of the Federal power similarly in doubt. The accepted propositions are restated and most of the cases, strict and
liberal, are cited. A quotation to the effect that "building is as
essentially local as mining, manufacturing, or growing crops"
perhaps is balanced by the conspicuous absence of Hammer v.
Dagenhartgfrom among the authorities relied upon; by the notation that "Defendants do not sell poultry in interstate commerce"; and by the assertion that the precise line between interstate and intrastate matters "can be drawn only as individual
cases arise." The Federal power has been restricted by the
Schechter decision, but how severely no one can say with certainty.
And even if the Court intended to exclude Federal regulation of
wages and hours to the utmost extent, it will be a simple matter
for it to repudiate in future, if it wishes, the dicta which go beyond the facts of the case. The way is pointed anew in the welcome Rathbun case, decided on the same day.9
It seems fair to criticize the Government on account of four
blunders in bringing its test case in regard to the N. I. R. A.
before the court. These are: (1) the evasion and delay which
postponed a decision until the acute economic emergency seemed
8 (1918)

247 U. S. 251, 20 St. Louis L. Rev. at 210-211.
9 55 S. Ct. 869. In this decision the Court held that Congress might restrict the President's power to remove such quasi-judicial officers of the
government as members of the Federal Trade Commission. In the earlier
case of Myers v. United States (1926) 272 U. S. 52, the Court overthrew
a legislative restriction upon the President's removal of a third-class postmaster and in sweeping terms asserted that the power to remove officers of
the executive department is inherent in the President. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court in the Rathbun case, admitted that in the
earlier opinion "expressions occur which tend to sustain the government's
contention" in support of the President, but stated that "these are beyond
the point involved and therefore do not come within the rule of stare decisis. In so far as they are out of harmony with the views here set forth,
these expressions are disapproved."
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past and public sentiment had cooled; (2) the selection of a case
which involved the less obvious rather than the more obvious
interrelations between intrastate transactions and interstate commerce; (3) the introduction into the case of irrelevant points
of the highest importance, whose decision should only be had in
controversies directly involving them, in which their significance
can be fully developed; and (4) inadequate presentation of the
all-important point which had been dragged into the case.
The fourth critcism applies to the argument that the wages
and hours of labor throughout industry and trade should be held
to be subject to Federal regulation. The Government's brief and
the appendix contain well-phrased statements of some of the
reasons why competition and interdependence call for uniform
economic legislation over the entire country; indications of a
widespread feeling to this effect in regard to wages and hours;
a limited number of statements by prominent individuals upon
the justification for Federal control; an analysis of the legal
precedents tending to uphold the Federal power; and fragmentary data indicating the extent and concentration of industrial
enterprise in the United States. Apparently judicial notice was
relied upon to bring to the minds of the justices, without the
stimulus of further data or opinions in the brief, a reasonably
accurate and complete picture of the integrated economic structure of the nation. Needless to say, much more was called for.
In contrast to this inadequacy stands the apparently thorough
and careful record 0 and argument which were constructed to
support the application of the Federal power to the regulated
aspects of the live poultry industry of New York City. That the
presentation of this branch of the case was not more convincing
to the Court is perhaps a valid reason for contending that equal
care in regard to the broader issue would have been similarly
futile. The theory of litigation, however, is that truth will be attained after thorough presentation and argument. A fatalistic
attitude on the part of one of the contenders is not an aid either
to victory or to correctness in the outcome.
l The writer has not had the opportunity to examine the record in the
Schechter case, but it is reflected in the opinions and in the Government's
brief. There is no indication that it contains material relating to the larger
question of Federal power whose presentation is discussed in the text of
this article above, nor would testimony upon this question have been pertinent to the issues before the jury at the trial.
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Criticism of the actual decision in the Schechter case is difficult
to offer. If the "purchasing power" basis for Federal regulation
of wages and hours be rejected, the writer believes the decision
of the circuit court of appeals to be sounder than that of the
Supreme Court. The relation of wages and hours in the defendants' establishments to the welfare of the national live poultry
industry is tenuous if not non-existent. The repercussions of bad
trade practices upon prices and volume of commerce throughout
the country were, however, clearly established, and the practicability of excluding "sick chickens" by choking off the market for
them was hardly disputed. It is a bit difficult to see why if combinations which affect prices and volume of business in interstate
commerce are subject to Federal control, unfair trade practices
which have the same effect should not be, even where they are
carried on in a single community. Nor is it clear why, if inspection of goods before shipment in order to bar harmful products from interstate commerce is a Federal function, the imposition of restrictions upon their sale afterward is not a legitimate means to the same end. Admittedly, however, the economic
consequences upon which the scope of the Federal power depends
are a matter of degree and the Court could not do otherwise than
draw the line where its best judgment dictated.
In so far, however, as the Court may have intended to assert
that, regardless of consequences, the Federal power must remain
restricted in order to preserve a field for the independent action
of the states in economic matters, its utterance may be criticized
on the basis of another view which has considerable historical
warrant. If, as there is reason to believe,"" it was the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to create a Federal Government which should have all the power necessary to deal with
national economic concerns, assuring to the states only the power
to control those economic matters whose significance is confined
to their own boundaries, the Court's assumed dicta would amend
the Constitution to the detriment of the Federal power at the
very time when that power is most needed to cope with national
problems. If such is the outcome of the Sehechter decision, the
result will constitute one of the most ironic tragedies of modern
it Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court (1934) c. I; Stern, That
Commerce Which Concerns More States than One (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev.
1335.
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times. Nor does the unanimity of the Court preclude the correctness of this view; for it may still be true that the conclusions of
the national administration and of a few students and observers1 2
are nearer to the truth than those of the justices. If such be the
case, the Court may be the victim of its own earnestness and
public spirit in disposing of the Schechter case along with many
others in less than four weeks' time. Its performance in that regard is little short of phenomenal.
Nor is it necessarily an answer to the foregoing that a constitutional amendment enlarging the Federal power, if such an
enlargement really is necessary, will eliminate the difficulty.
Granting that the wisdom to amend the Constitution to meet
present-day needs or even to frame a new constitution exists in
the nation, it seems doubtful whether that wisdom can be brought
to bear in a deliberative manner upon a sufficient scale to arrive
at a conclusion upon constitutional questions that are subject to
severe conflicts of interest. The lobbying which attends the ordinary legislative process, the fierce light of publicity which beats
upon the statesman, and the pitiless pressure from the four corners of the land which in a few hours can be made to descend
upon the legislator would be multiplied many fold when applied
to a constitutional convention meeting in public or to the legislatures or state conventions called to consider constitutional
amendments of a fundamental nature. It is doubtful, on the other
hand, whether the product of executive sessions could command
sufficient confidence to win adoption. Thus it may be that the
existing government can evolve only through piecemeal growth
at the hands of the sole central deliberative body that as yet exists, namely Congress. If the opportunity for such growth has
been cut off, the consequences are difficult to foretell.
II. THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

In dealing with the question of the delegation of power by
Congress to the President the Court in the Schechter case has
made a distinction which has not been made previously in express terms and which may be helpful in the drafting of future
legislation and the decision of future cases. In the PaamaRefining case,13 as Mr. Chief Justice Hughes points out in the
1 Ibid.
Is (1935) 55 S. Ct. 241, 20 St. Louis L. Rev. at 217.
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Schechter opinion, "The question was with respect to the range
of discretion given to the President" in deciding whether to issue
or not to issue an order establishing a Federal offense defined
in the statute. As respects the codes of fair competition, on the
other hand, the President was given discretion not only in regard
to whether codes should issue for particular industries but also
as to their content. This point is emphasized especially in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo and is covered also
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' statement that the more important
question in the Schechter case is "whether there is any adequate
definition of the subject to which the codes are to be addressed."
In other words, the adequacy of the legislatively prescribed guides
contained in the National Industrial Recovery Act had to be considered with reference to the dual aspect imparted to the President's discretion; and of these aspects the determination of the
content of the codes was much the more significant. Conceivably,
although the two questions are intertwined, the guides might be
sufficient for the one purpose and not for the other, as Mr. Justice
Cardozo in fact seems to have concluded."'
In addition to the purposes of the N. I. R. A. set forth in section 1, which the President was specifically directed in section 3
to find would be served by any code which he undertook to promulgate, the fact that the codes were to be codes of fair competition furnished the Government's chief reliance in its endeavor
to convince the Court that the Act contained sufficient guides to
the President. Its effort was to read into the term "fair competition" in this connection the meaning which it has acquired at
common law and under the Federal Trade Commission Act. This
effort was doomed to failure before it was made, for, as the Court
easily saw, "The 'fair competition' of the codes has a much
broader range and a new significance." The President was expressly authorized to include anything in the codes that would
effectuate the policy of the Act as declared in section 1, including,
as the Court pointed out, "the elimination of unfair competitive
practices." The words "unfair competitive practices" pretty
clearly had the connotations which have developed previously in
14 Mr. Justice Cardozo, it will be remembered, dissented in the Panama
Refining case upon the ground that the declaration of policy in the N. I.
R. A. furnished a sufficient guide to the President in deciding whether or
not to prohibit the interstate shipment of petroleum illegally produced.
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the law and, just as clearly, the phrase "fair competition" elsewhere in the Act had a much wider content. The provisions of
the codes themselves show that the administration acted upon
this assumption. Thus remitted to section 1 for the guides to the
President, the Court held them to be inadequate, as it had indicated previously that they were.
Equally futile was the Government's attempt to convince the
Court that the opportunity given to trade associations to propose
codes to the President somehow made a difference. Clearly these
proposals had no force; the President was not bound by them in
the slightest degree; and the Act would, if that were possible,
have been even more unconstitutional than it was if it had attempted to confer actual rule-making power upon private groups.
For: "Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our
law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress."
Sympathizing with the Court, as one naturally does, in its rejection of irrelevant arguments, it is still possible to question
whether the decision in regard to the delegation of legislative
power is sound. To some it seems that Congress had indicated
with reasonable clarity the ends which it wished to have served
by means of the powers conferred upon the executive. Assuming,
as did the Court, that the procedure laid down for the President
to follow was not wanting in due process, it is questionable at
best whether under modern conditions a sufficiently comprehensive, varied, and flexible control of economic activity can be established with greater initial participation by the legislature or
whether in the long run, if the system does not break down in
the meanwhile, the Court will not be compelled to accept legislation which does not differ substantially in this respect from the
National Industrial Recovery Act. With the legislature continuously available to checkmate possible excesses on the part of the
executive and to clarify and improve deficient legislation, it is
doubtful at best whether "dictatorship" or "tyranny" will be
brought appreciably nearer by such means.
Be that as it may, the clarification introduced by the Schechter
decision into the situation left by the PanamaRefining case cannot but be welcome. This much at least is definite: (1) Congress
must define its policy in future legislation which delegates discretion to the executive with somewhat greater particularity than

THE SCHECHTER CASE

in section 1 of the N. I. R. A.; (2) Congress must state with
some definiteness the permissible content of rules which it authorizes the President to promulgate with binding effect upon private
persons; and (3) Congress must require express findings on the'
part of the executive that the statutory conditions precedent to
such executive rule-making actually exist. Nevertheless one
shrinks from contemplating the volume of litigation which will
attend the attempt to enforce each new statute that confers
powers of this nature and the paralysis in administration which
is certain to prevail in each instance until the matter has been
disposed of.
III.

THE STATUS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The situation precipitated by the Schechter decision exemplifies perfectly the price that is paid for the system of judicial
review of legislation that has developed in this country. So great
is the doubt regarding the scope of the Federal power, that Congress and the administration must either refrain from adopting
measures deemed essential to the country's welfare or else run
the chance of having them overthrown in court by judges who
are in no way responsible for the solution of the economic and
social problems involved and who could not offer suggestions if
they would. The debate upon pending measures is shifted to a
large degree from their merits to their constitutionality and the
effectiveness of any laws that are adopted is certain to be postponed until litigation has been concluded. Such a situation is
tolerable only if it is true that "That government is best which
governs least"-a proposition which few would care openly to
avow at the present time.
The very uncertainty of the situation, however, suggests a possible way out. Well-planned presentation of future cases involving the constitutionality of existing and contemplated Federal
regulatory legislation may result in judicial recognition of a
Federal power adequate to cope with the more important problems. The effort to achieve such an outcome will appear illegitimate only to those who believe that the Supreme Court has already spoken with clarity, that its views necessarily are correct,
and that under no circumstances would it repudiate anything it
has said. Such a view, of course, is at variance with experience
as well as with reason.

